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collaborations: Professor David Nimmer's interpretation of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act's (DMCA) repeat infringer standard. Any collaboration where
suspected infringers lose internet access at the direction of the RIAA must affect only
those who have been previously held liable for copyright infringement or of whom the
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INTRODUCTION
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) argues
that "Internet-based transfers of media files threaten [its] livelihood."'
Despite powerful copyright protection,2 any person armed with a
computer and internet access can rapidly distribute digital copies of
songs 3 at a "drastically reduced" cost.4 This "digital moment"' has turned
everybody into potential distributors and, in the eyes of copyright
holders, into potentially dangerous copyright infringers. While not every
I. JOHN LOGIE, PEERS, PIRATES, AND PERSUASION 6 (2oo6); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMI1X:
MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY, at xv-xvi (2oo8) (describing the war on
piracy which "threatens" the "survival" of "certain important American industries").
2. See 17 U.S.C. § io6 (2oo6) (providing for the exclusive rights of the copyright holder); YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 57 (2oo6) ("By the end of the twentieth century, copyright was
longer, broader, and vastly more encompassing than it had been at the beginning of that century.").
See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BASICS (2oo8), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circoi.pdf.
3. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT's PARADOx 86 (2oo8); see also JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 154 (2oo6) ("MP3 is a patented file-compression format that permits near-CD
quality recordings to be reproduced in files of manageable size. Freely available software allows
consumers to translate the musical recordings on commercial CDs to MP3 files on a computer hard
disk, and play the music through the computer's speakers. Because MP3 files have been compressed, it
is feasible to store large numbers of files on a typical computer hard disk, and to transmit high-quality
recordings over the Internet. Consumers can download entire music libraries over their telephone
lines.").
4. NETANEL, supra note 3.
5. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 151-52 (2001) (using the phrase "digital moment" to describe the
combination of the digitization of expression and the rise of networks).
6. Chuck Philips, Piracy: Music Giants Miss a Beat on the Web, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2ooo, at Ai
(" This is a very profound moment historically,' Time Warner President Richard Parsons says. 'This
isn't just about a bunch of kids stealing music. It's about an assault on everything that constitutes the
cultural expression of our society. If we fail to protect and preserve our intellectual property system,
the culture will atrophy. And corporations won't be the only ones hurt. Artists will have no incentive
to create. Worst-case scenario: The country will end up in a sort of cultural Dark Ages."); see also
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, at 173 (2oo6) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE 2.0] (calling "digital technologies
and the Internet" the "perfect storm" for copyright holders, and noting that because "they made
money by controlling the distribution of 'copies' of copyrighted content, you could well understand
why they viewed the Internet as a grave threat"). Napster was estimated to have eighty-million users
before it was shut down. LOGIE, supra note i. By 2oo6, the number of Americans using file-sharing
programs had increased to a point where it "dwarfed Napster's purported totals." Id. Efforts to stop
file sharing seemingly led to its popularity. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTruE OF IDEAS O1-32 (2001)
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unauthorized download represents a lost sale,' and the precise figures are
in dispute, the RIAA estimates that the total annual cost from "all forms
of piracy" is $4.2 billion; a more conservative estimate puts the loss at
$330 million.8
After 35,000 lawsuits against peer-to-peer file sharers, the RIAA
recently announced that it would no longer file mass-lawsuits, instead
proposing a new collaboration with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
stop online copyright infringement.' While ISPs and the RIAA did not
always have aligned interests in the past,'o ISPs have recently become
motivated to find ways to stop file sharing because it has created
unexpected burdens on networks," and because peer-to-peer file sharing
allows for free distribution of copyrighted content for which people
would ordinarily pay their cable and internet providers." For example,
[hereinafter LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS] (noting that the number of users went from under two-hundred-
thousand to over fifty-seven-million after the RIAA's lawsuit against Napster became public).
7. See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers, 22 CARDOzo ARTS ENT. L.J. 725,
737 (2005) ("Lots of people will take something for free even if they would never pay for the same
thing. That's how party favors and much of modern marketing works.").
8. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 6, at 337. One independent study put the total economic loss to
the United States economy from sound recording piracy at $12.5 billion annually. See STEPHEN E.
SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY
188 (2oo7), available at
http://www.ipi.org/IPI/IPIPublications.nsflPublicationLookupFullTextPDF/5CC65AID4779E4o86257
33Eo529174/$File/SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf.
9. Recording Industry to Discontinue Litigation Program, Cites Changing Marketplace, 77
U.S.L.W. 2392 (2009) [hereinafter Changing Marketplace]; Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music
Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at Bi, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html; see also Kristen Schweizer & Adam Satariano,
Record Labels Make ISPs 'Copyright Cops' for Piracy (Update i), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 13, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2o6oo88&sid=axE-xX82Yp.8&refer=muse.
io. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3 d 1229, 1233 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). Verizon objected to the RIAA's subpoenas, arguing that the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act's (DMCA) takedown provision "does not apply to an ISP acting merely as a conduit for an
individual using a P2P file sharing program to exchange files." Id. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, holding that the subpoenas directed at it were unauthorized because the DMCA's
section 512(a) safe-harbor provision protected ISPs from having to respond to subpoenas when they
were only involved in transmission of data. Id. at 1235. In 2003, SBC actually encouraged its
subscribers to download their own music collection. Seth Schiesel, SBC Won't Name Names in File-
Sharing Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at Ci, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9Fo3E3D7163AF935A2575ACoA9659C8B63.
I I. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEo. L.J.
1847, 1862-63 (2oo6) (discussing how the increasingly heterogeneous content and uses of the internet
have placed unprecedented demands on networks); Robert McDowell, Who Should Solve This
Internet Crisis, WASH. POST, July 28, 2oo8, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2oo8/o7/27/AR2oo8o727o172.html?referrer=emailarticle ("At peak times, 5 percent of
Internet consumers are using 9o percent of the available bandwidth because of the P2P explosion. This
flood of data has created a tyranny by a minority. Slower speeds degrade the quality of the service that
consumers have paid for and ultimately diminish America's competitiveness globally.").
12. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R.
13028 1 6 (2oo8) (memorandum opinion & order) [hereinafter Comcast Order]; see Joseph Schleimer,
Protecting Copyrights at the "Backbone" Level of the Internet, x5 UCLA ErN. L. REV. 139 '45 (2008)
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BitTorrent, which is an "innovative, popular and, as-yet unlitigated file-
sharing technology,"' 3 "comprise[s] between 35% and 67.5% of all global
Internet traffic" and often contains copyright-infringing media.' 4 ISPs are
also motivated to stop file sharing because they seek to expand their
content offerings and possibly license digital content.'5
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently stopped
Comcast, the second-largest ISP in the United States, from
discriminating against peer-to-peer file sharing programs, such as
BitTorrent. 6 As the Comcast example shows, the future of the battle
between copyright holders and peer-to-peer file sharers may occur at the
network level. The internet was founded on a theory of end-to-end
freedom, where there was no discrimination against any content or
applications." Now, as has already occurred in other countries,' United
States ISPs have begun to collaborate with the RIAA to terminate or
suspend the accounts of alleged file sharers.'9
("As a competitive matter, the ISPs must start licensing entertainment content or risk a loss of their
customer base to competitors who do provide entertainment."); Changing Marketplace, supra note 9
(noting shared business interests between ISPs and the RIAA).
13. Rebecca Giblin, A Bit Liable: A Guide to Navigating the U.S. Secondary Liability Patchwork,
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 7,8 (2008).
14. Id. at 9-1o.
15. See infra Part II.A.i.
16. Comcast Order, supra note 12, $ 16, 48, 54; Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet
Traffic, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/.
17. LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 6, at 34-41 (describing the end-to-end principle of
network design and how it "effects a neutral platform-neutral in the sense that the network owner
can't discriminate against some packets while favoring others.... The network will remain neutral
regardless of the application," and comparing this end-to-end design to an electricity grid or a road);
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1789 (2oo2) [hereinafter Lessig,
Architecture].
18. AFP, French web pours scorn on anti-piracy plans, Mar. io, 2oo9, available at http://
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iEycpBP-6skclEzwA5VooOnhlq6w; John Drinnan,
Media: ISPs Throwing Pirates Overboard, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. Is, 2009, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/
business/news/article.cfm?c id=3&objectid 10561373&ref=emailfriend; Georgie Rogers, Government
Gets Tough, BBC, Jan. 29, 2oo9, http://www.bbc.co.uk/6music/news/2oo9o29_ISP_report.shtml; Mark
Ward, Net Firms Reject Monitoring Role, BBC NEws, Feb. 1_, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/72464o3.stm; see John Hearne, Ireland's Largest ISP to Start 'Throttling' Illegal
Downloaders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONFOR, July 24, 2009, at 6, available at http://
www.csmonitor.cOm/2009/0724/po6sio-wogn.html; Bruce Crumley, France Cracks Down on Internet
Downloads, TIME, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/o,8599,1884812,oo.html;
Posting of Bruce Gain to Intellectual Property Watch Blog, French Legislature Puts Finishing Touches
on Ambitious File-Sharing Law, http://www.ip-watch.orglweblog/2009/02/23/french-legislature-puts-
finishing-touches-on-ambitious-file-sharing-law/ (Feb. 23, 2oo9, It:i4 am); Angela Gunn, Quelle
Horreur: French President Wants to Chop Net Access for Alleged Downloaders, BETANEWS, Mar. 12,
2oo9, http://www.betanews.com/article/Quelle-horreur-French-president-wants-to-chop-net-access-for-
alleged-downloaders/12368974o9.




In 2005, the FCC promulgated its Internet Policy Statement,
explaining its approach to the internet.2 o The FCC has currently proposed
rules that would formally codify these principles." This Note argues that
the FCC should apply the Internet Policy Statement in a novel way to
invalidate these United States ISP-RIAA collaborations both because
they are an extreme form of network management, and because they,
like other forms of network management, have a high potential for abuse
and mistakes that would lead to subscribers being denied access to the
lawful content of their choice. This Note further argues that the FCC
should adopt Professor David Nimmer's interpretation of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) repeat infringer termination
policy in evaluating the ISP-RIAA collaborations. Under this standard,
any collaboration where suspected infringers lose internet access at the
direction of the RIAA must be narrowly tailored only to affect those
who have been previously held liable for copyright infringement or of
whom the ISP has actual knowledge of infringement.
This Note is divided into five Parts. Part I discusses the Internet
Policy Statement, which incorporates principles of network neutrality,
and how the FCC applied the Internet Policy Statement in its Comcast
Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Comcast Order"). Part II establishes
that the Internet Policy Statement, which has previously only been
applied to network-wide throttling, should apply to the United States
ISP-RIAA collaborations because these collaborations are an extreme
form of network management and because, like other forms of network
management, they have great potential to cut subscribers off from the
lawful content of their choice. Part II further argues that the new
collaborations between ISPs and the RIAA do not live up to the
mandates of the Comcast Order. Part III proposes that the FCC should
use Professor Nimmer's interpretation of the standard for "repeat
infringement" in the DMCA to determine when an ISP may terminate a
subscriber's internet connection. Because of the importance the Internet
Policy Statement affords to preserving people's access to the lawful
content of their choice, an ISP should only be able to cut off a
subscriber's internet access in the name of stopping piracy if the conduct
meets the repeat infringer standard. Part IV briefly shows that ISP-level
copyright enforcement efforts, relying on mere allegations to suspend or
terminate a subscriber's internet connection, are a new trend occurring
around the world. Part V addresses and dispels likely counterarguments.
20. FCC Broadband Network Management, http://www.fcc.gov/broadband-networkmanagement/
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
21. See Press Release, FCC, Commission Seeks Public Input on Draft Rules to Preserve the Free
and Open Internet (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
294159A Ipdf.
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I. THE END-TO-END NETWORK DESIGN PRINCIPLE, AND WHAT
NETWORK NEUTRALITY LOOKs LIKE TODAY
This Part discusses the recent history of network neutrality. It
explains the importance of the internet and its end-to-end design
principle. It finally provides background on the FCC's protection of
network neutrality, both in the Internet Policy Statement and the
Comcast Order.
A. END-TO-END, THE ALL IMPORTANT INTERNET, AND THE INTERNET
POLICY STATEMENT
The creators of the internet built it using an end-to-end design
principle, "counsel[ing] that a network should be kept as simple as
possible and that the intelligence required in a network be vested at the
edge, or ends of a network."" The end-to-end design principle, where the
designers of the network "had little concern for controlling the network
or its user's behavior," led to the concept of network neutrality.?
Network neutrality, in a nutshell, means that network providers do not
discriminate against the content being transmitted over the network;
there should be simple networks but smart applications. 24 The internet
delivers packets of information, but the neutral network is not concerned
with what is in those packets.
To illustrate how network neutrality leads to innovation, Professor
Tim Wu compares a neutral internet to an electric grid:
The general purpose and neutral nature of the electric grid is one of
the things that make it extremely useful. The electric grid does not care
22. LEsSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 6, at iii; see Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1988-89 (2oo6). The edges, or ends, are the applications at the end of the network
connection. See Lessig, Architecture, supra note 17 (describing end-to-end principle as "simple
networks, smart applications"); Glossary.com, End to End Principle Reference, http://
www.glossary.com/reference.php?q=End+to+end+principle (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (defining end-to-
end principle as"'[D]umb, minimal, network' with smart terminals").
23. JONATHAN ZrrTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How TO STOP IT 28 (2008)
[hereinafter ZrRAIN, FUTURE]; see Zittrain, supra note 22, at 197
8 , 2029.
24. Lessig, Architecture, supra note 17, at 1978; see Zittrain, supra note 22, at 2029; Network
Neutrality FAQ, http://timwu.org/network-neutrality.htmi (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
25. ZrrrRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at Iii; Lessig, Architecture, supra note 17, at 1789. This
same principle is generally observed regarding telecommunications networks. See YOCHAI BENKLER,
RULES OF THE ROAD FOR THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW
§ 16.2 (1996). Benkler notes that telecommunications networks are "bulk based services, whose
primary function in the network is to carry as much traffic as possible over the greater portion of its
way." Id.; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, TELECOM ANTrrRUST HANDBOOK 5 (2005) ("All
communications networks share a common purpose: to transmit information from one point to
another."); Susan Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 873-74 (2oo9) ("The
founders of United States communications law chose to allow private companies in the telegraphy and
telephone business to provide general-purpose communications services subject to a key regulatory




if you plug in a toaster, an iron, or a computer. Consequently it has
survived and supported giant waves of innovation in the appliance
market.6
Another apt analogy is a road. The road does not discriminate
against its drivers and is indifferent to those driving upon it." In building
the internet, the goal was "not to offer a particular set of information or
services like news or weather to customers .... Rather, it was to connect
anyone on the network to anyone else."" Like the engineer who need
not obtain the electrical company's permission before designing a new
microwave, end-to-end network design allows people the freedom to
innovate and design useful products for the network.29
This end-to-end design principle is "one of the most important
reasons that the internet produced the innovation and growth that it has
enjoyed."30 Accordingly, the internet, with its end-to-end design, "gives
Americans 'a great degree of control over the information that they
receive""' and "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity." 32  A neutral network is crucial because
"[i]nformation, knowledge, and culture are central to human freedom
and human development."3 3 In this networked information economy,
"the removal of the physical constraints on effective information
production has made human creativity and the economics of information
itself the core structuring facts." 34
The FCC's Internet Policy Statement arose out of this end-to-end
principle of network design. The FCC has the authority to implement the
United States' congressionally provided internet policy, which includes
"preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
26. Network Neutrality FAQ, supra note 24; see also LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 6, at
34-41 (describing the end-to-end principle of network design and how it "effects a neutral platform-
neutral in the sense that the network owner can't discriminate against some packets while favoring
others. ... The network will remain neutral regardless of the application."); Lawrence Lessig &
Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. PosT, June 8, 2oo6, at A23 ("The owners of
the Internet's wires cannot discriminate. . .. All of the intelligence and control is held by producers
and users, not the networks that connect them.").
27. LESSIG, FuTuRE OF IDEAS, supra note 6, at 34-41. Lessig contrasts cars on roads with airplanes
in the sky; unlike cars, airplanes must register flight plans, or they will be denied permission to fly. Id.
28. ZrrTRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at 27.
29. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 6, at iii; Lessig, Architecture, supra note 17, at 1789
("Innovators thus knew that, if their ideas were wanted, the network would run them; that this
network was architected never to allow anyone to decide what would be allowed.").
30. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 6, at.44.
31. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 1 12 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 23o(a)(2) (2006)).
32. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 23o(a)(4)).
33. BENKLER, supra note 2, at 1.
34. Id. at 7.
35. In re Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 84986 (2005) (policy statement) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement].
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exists for the Internet," "promot[ing] the continued development of the
Internet," and "encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability."' 6  In the
Internet Policy Statement, the FCC noted that it had "jurisdiction
necessary to ensure that providers of telecommunications for internet
access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) services are operated
in a neutral manner."37 The FCC adopted the following principles
regarding the internet, which it pledged to implement in its "ongoing
policymaking activities,"'5 and is currently in the process of codifying
through a formal Notice and Comment rulemaking:39
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to
the needs of law enforcement.
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network.
36. FCC Broadband Network Management, supra note 2o; see 47 U.S.C. §H 157, 230(b) (2oo6).
The FCC is charged with "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio."Id. § 151. The FCC's jurisdiction to regulate broadband is documented under various bases.
Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35, 2, 4; Comcast Order, supra note 12, 12-27 (providing
multiple grounds for FCC's jurisdiction in the Comcast dispute); Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 2o F.C.C.R. 14853, 96 (2005) (report,
order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order]. The Supreme
Court agrees that the FCC has the authority to regulate broadband. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976, 996 (2005) ("[T]he Commission has jurisdiction to
impose additional regulatory obligations. . . [and] remains free to impose special regulatory duties on
facilities-based ISPs under its Title i ancillary jurisdiction."); see also 47 U.S.C. § 157 (discussing policy
regarding new technologies); Crawford, supra note 25, at 911-12 n.2o5 (discussing the FCC's ancillary
authority).
37. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35, 4.
38. Id. 5.
39. See Press Release, FCC, supra note 21. There is also a pending bipartisan bill in the House of
Representatives which would enact the net neutrality principles espoused in the Internet Policy
Statement. See Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, Inith Cong. (2009); Marguerite
Reardon, Net Neutrality Still Faces Political, Legal Hurdles, CNET News, Oct. 24, 2009, http://
news.cnet.com/83oI-3o686_3-bo38162o-266.html. These efforts have inspired opposition, most notably
from Senator John McCain, who recently proposed legislation to strip the FCC of its jurisdiction to
regulate the internet. See Internet Freedom Act of 2oo9, S. 1836, ith Cong. (2009) ("The Federal
Communications Commission shall not propose, promulgate, or issue any regulations regarding the
Internet or IP-enabled services."); Joelle Tessler, FCC Votes to Begin Crafting "Net Neutrality" Rules,
MsNBc.coM, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/33434714/ns/technologyand science-tech
and-gadgets/; see also Nate Anderson, House, Senate Get Separate Bills to Kill Net Neutrality, ARS




To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to competition among network providers, application and
service providers, and content providers. 0
The FCC's Internet Policy Statement strongly emphasizes
preserving the neutral character of the internet by allowing consumers
access to the lawful content, devices, and applications of their choice. But
the FCC mentions, in a footnote, that the principles are "subject to
reasonable network management."4 ' The precise contours of reasonable
network management, and how the FCC would apply the Internet Policy
Statement, were unclear until the FCC's 2oo8 Comcast Order."
B. THE COMCAST MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Network neutrality used to be considered "a solution looking for a
problem." 43 Its opponents argued that "fears raised by those calling for
new net neutrality mandates have not materialized. Consumers have
access to an Internet that takes them wherever they want to go. That's
what consumers want, so that's what providers will offer."" Since this
free-market solution seemed to be working, there was little incentive to
create rules requiring neutrality, which "run contrary to the longstanding
policy of keeping the Internet free from regulation."45
However, that all changed in 2007, when Comcast took steps to ease
network congestion by interfering with peer-to-peer traffic.46 Specifically,
it falsified packets of data that fooled users and their peer-to-peer
programs into thinking they were transferring files,47 when in fact these
"RST" packets terminated connections of people who were uploading
files using peer-to-peer clients.4' This practice was documented by the
Associated Press49 and challenged by consumer groups.0 Comcast
40. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35, 1 4 (footnote omitted).
41.- Id. 15 n-15.
42. Comcast Order, supra note 12.
43. See Letter from Lawrence Lessig & Tim Wu, Professors of Law, to Marlene H. Deutch,
Secretary, FCC (Aug. 22, 2003), available at www.freepress.net/files/wulessig-fcc.pdf. For further
discussion of this argument, see JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 750 (5th ed. 2007)
("Some characterize net neutrality regulation as 'a solution in search of a problem' . . .. "); Press
Release, FreedomWorks, Internet Neutrality: A Solution in Search of a Problem (Feb. 7, 2oo6),
available at http://www.freedomworks.org/press-releases/intemet-neutrality-a-solution-in-search-of-a-prob.
44. Press Release, FreedomWorks, supra note 43.
45. HART, supra note 43.
46. Comcast Order, supra note z12, 1 7, 8; Posting of Brad Stone to New York Times Bits,
Comcast: We're Delaying, Not Blocking, BitTorrent Traffic, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2oo7/1o/22/
comcast-were-delaying-not-blocking-bittorrent-traffic/?scp=5&sq=bittorrent&st=cse (Oct. 22, 2004,
21:41 EST); Svensson, supra note 16.
47. Comcast Order, supra note I2, 8.
48. Id. 9 3, 8-1o.
49. Svensson, supra note 16.
50. See Formal Complaint, In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against
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initially denied that it interfered with its subscribers' uploads, but later
admitted it," arguing that it could interfere with peer-to-peer file sharing
on its networks under the auspices of conducting "reasonable network
management."
The FCC held a hearing and concluded that Comcast violated the
principles of the Internet Policy Statement because Comcast's
"discriminatory and arbitrary practice unduly squelche[d] the dynamic
benefits of an open and accessible Internet and [did] not constitute
reasonable network management."" The FCC reasoned that
Comcast determines how it will route some connections based not on
their destinations but on their contents; in laymen's terms, Comcast
opens its customers' mail because it wants to deliver mail not based on
the address or type of stamp on the envelope but on the type of letter
contained therein.54
For instance, rather than stopping all broadband-intensive transfers
regardless of whether they were peer-to-peer transfers, Comcast stopped
only peer-to-peer transfers, even those that used little bandwidth."
The FCC also provided clear guidelines to any ISP wishing to
engage in reasonable network management, noting that reasonable
network management practices must "clear a high threshold" and
"should further a critically important interest and be narrowly or
carefully tailored to serve that interest.",6 The FCC suggested ways that
Comcast could have achieved its goal of stopping network congestion,
including capping the average user's capacity and charging the most
aggressive users overage fees, throttling back the connections of all high
capacity users, or negotiating directly with the application providers and
developing new technologies." All of these methods may be permissible
because they decrease the burden on the network without discriminating
against specific content, applications, or devices.' Finally, the FCC left
the door open for ISPs to curb copyright infringement, noting that
Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (No. 07-52), available at www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/
fp pk-comcast complaint.pdf.
51. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 9; Declan McCullagh, FCC Formally Rules Comcast's
Throttling of BitTorrent Was Illegal, CNET NEWs, Aug. I, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/83o-13578-3-
100045o8-38.html.
52. See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35, 5 n.15.
53. Comcast Order, supra note 12, I; see also Matthew Lasar, Cable and Telcos Side with
Comcast in FCC BitTorrent Dispute, ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 19, 2oo8, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/
2oo8/o2/cable-and-telcos-side-with-comcast-in-fcc-bittorrent-dispute.ars (summarizing the statements
of the interested parties).
54. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 41.
55. Id. 48. Comcast agreed to stop its practices by the end of 2oo8, and was required to make






"providers, consistent with federal policy, may block transmissions of
illegal content (e.g., child pornography) or transmissions that violate
copyright law." 59
II. THE COMCAST ORDER'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ISP-RIAA
COLLABORATIONS
Part I showed that ISPs have some leeway to stop copyright
infringement from occurring on their networks, but must also allow
people access to the lawful content of their choice. Part II first describes
the RIAA's proposed collaborations with the ISPs to stop copyright
infringement. It next shows why the new collaborations are an extreme
form of network management. The Internet Policy Statement has not
previously been applied to agreements like this because they never
existed before, but this Note argues that it should apply and shows that
the ISP-RIAA collaborations will likely deprive users of the lawful
content of their choice. Part II then applies the Internet Policy Statement
to the ISP-RIAA collaborations for the first time, showing that they do
not qualify as reasonable network management because of their reliance
on DMCA takedown notices.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE ISP-RIAA COLLABORATIONS"6
i. The ISP's Problems: Congestion and the Desire to Offer
Copyrighted Content
As previously discussed, the RIAA sees file sharing as a severe
threat that must be curbed.6' Suddenly, after years of ISPs not stopping
file sharing and comfortably enjoying immunity from copyright liabilitY
based on subscriber's file sharing because of safe harbor provisions,
ISPs have also become motivated to stop peer-to-peer file sharing. File
sharing both congests ISP networks and distributes some content, often
for free, for which users might normally pay the ISPs.63
59. Id. 50.
6o. This Note is primarily concerned with the legality of an ISP-RIAA collaboration. Thus, the
discussion in this section of the problem the collaboration addresses will be minimal. Further, this
Note will not consider the practical effectiveness of the ISP-RIAA collaboration. For a discussion of
the effectiveness of threatening to revoke network privileges in deterring file sharing, see Yuval
Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 6o6 (2oo6).
61. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
62. ISPs had a dual layer of immunity from copyright infringement. They were immune from
direct infringement liability where they had no knowledge of the infringing activity. Religious Tech.
Servs. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-71 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Further, if a successful case for direct or
indirect liability were made against an ISP, the first DMCA safe harbor would protect them. See 17
U.S.C. § 512(a) (2oo6) (providing a safe harbor from contributory copyright infringement for online
service providers involved in transmission of data); see also CHARLEs H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCrION
TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONs LAW 145-49 (2d ed. 2ooi) (discussing ISP's liability for infringement and
the DMCA safe harbors).
63. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 5 ("Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on
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As for network congestion, the high volume of file sharing-as
Americans both refuse to follow traditional copyright law6 and use peer-
to-peer file sharing programs for legitimate, bandwidth intensive
purposes6'-has caused unanticipated problems for ISPs. A
Commissioner of the FCC recently noted that sometimes "only five
percent of broadband users are consuming as much as 90 percent of
network capacity. [Peer-to-peer] usage is causing congestion .-. .. "
This rampant file sharing threatens the ISP's bottom line. The
RIAA's general counsel recently noted that "[i]t's clear that we've
reached a point where the business interests of ISPs and content owners
are now aligned and the heavy file-sharing of online content is a mutual
problem.""' Not only are ISPs worried about disappointing customers
through slow speeds and congested networks, 68 they are also expanding
their content offerings and now have the same incentives as the RIAA to
stop copyright infringement.69
BitTorrent, have become a competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast because Internet
users have the opportunity to view high-quality video with BitTorrent that they might otherwise watch
(and pay for) on cable television."); see also Schleimer, supra note 12, at 144-45; Yoo, supra note iI
(discussing demands on networks); McDowell, supra note ii (discussing congestion problems);
Changing Marketplace, supra note 9 (noting that copyright holders and ISPs share business interests).
64. Copyright laws are widely disobeyed. See Feldman & Nadler, supra note 6o, at 579 (noting
that traffic laws, tax laws, and copyright laws are widely ignored); see also LESSIG, supra note I, at i io-
14 (describing how normal children have been cast as criminals for their widespread file sharing and
asking whether "the next ten years [should] be another decade-long war against our kids?").
65. For instance, legitimate, licensed content distributors use BitTorrent to distribute purchased
videos. See Comcast Order, supra note 12, 1 4, 42 (discussing Vuze, one such service, and noting that
CBS, Twentieth Century Fox, and Sports Illustrated use BitTorrent to distribute content). Further,
popular computer game developer Blizzard uses BitTorrent to distribute content to its customers. See
Blizzard Entertainment-Blizzard FAQ, http://us.blizzard.comlen-us/company/about/legal-faq.html
(last visited Oct- 4, 2009); Blizzard Downloader-WoWWiki-Your Guide to the World of Warcraft,
http://www.wowwiki.com/BlizzardDownloader (last visited Oct. 4, 2009); see also Comcast Order,
supra note 12, 9 42 (discussing how Comcast's conduct interfered with a subscriber's World of
Warcraft patch).
66. Opening Statement of Comm'r Robert M. McDowell, Second Public En Banc Hearing On
Broadband Network Management Practices (Apr. 17, 2oo8), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatchlDOC-281646Ai.pdf; McDowell, supra note ii; see also William Triplett, MPAA, RIAA
Going Steady with ISPs, VARIETY, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.variety.com/article/
VR I17984591.html?categoryid=16&cs=i ("[P]iracy, the bane of the entertainment industry...has
also caused problems for Internet service providers. Slowdowns and congestion in ISP pipes are due to
heavy bandwidth use, much of which involves large files of pirated content.").
67. Changing Marketplace, supra note 9 (alteration in original).
68. See McDowell, supra note ii (discussing congestion problems caused by high bandwidth
users, referring to it as "tyranny by a minority").
69. Kenneth Corbin, The RIAA 's About-Face on Lawsuits, INTERNET NEWS, Dec. 22, 2oo8, http://
www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/379283 sfThe+RIAAs+AboutFace+on+Lawsuits.htm;
Schleimer, supra note 12, at 144-45
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2. The Proposed Collaborative Solution with the RIAA
In order to stop the flow of peer-to-peer file sharing, the RIAA
recently announced that it has reached preliminary agreements 0 with
ISPs to have the ISPs monitor their subscribers and institute a
"graduated response program."7' Under the proposed collaborations, the
ISP would forward DMCA takedown notices of alleged infringement to
its customers?. A DMCA takedown notice is a notice from the copyright
holder stating that the copyright holder has a good faith belief that the
subscriber has infringed copyright. Under the graduated response
program, ISP's "responses will gradually grow in severity as the number
of violations go up and may include suspension of service or even service
termination."74  While ISPs are "'skittish' about negative press," 5  the
RIAA claims that "the four largest U.S. labels have struck preliminary
accords to work more closely with ISPs," and the RIAA is still working
to reach final agreements with ISPs.76
B. AN ISP-RIAA COLLABORATION IS AN EXTREME FORM OF NETWORK
MANAGEMENT
The Internet Policy Statement allows for reasonable network
management and has only been applied by the FCC once-to invalidate
Comcast's network-wide peer-to-peer throttling.77 However, because the
ISP-RIAA collaborations are network management, the FCC should
also evaluate them according to the mandates of the Internet Policy
Statement. Network management "[r]efers to the broad subject of
managing computer networks."78 Network management could be further
70. Schweizer & Satariano, supra note 9.
71. Sandoval, supra note 19.
72. Id.; Greg Sandoval, Comcast, Cox Cooperating with RIAA in Antipiracy Campaign, CNET
NEWS, Mar. 25, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/83o-1023-3-IO204047-93.html.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2oo6). For an example of the type of notice the RIAA will send to the
ISP, see Greg Sandoval, Copy of RIAA's New Enforcement Notice to ISPs, CNET NEWS, Dec. i9,
2oo8, http://news.cnet.com/83ol-1o23-3-10127050-93.html.
74. Sandoval, supra note 19. Both AT&T and Charter Communications send letters saying they
may suspend or terminate service, although AT&T calls that language just "boilerplate." See Greg
Sandoval, How Charter Communications Warns Accused File Sharers, CNET NEWS, Apr. 19, 2009,
http://news.cnet.com/83o-1o23-3-1222853-93.html?tag=mncol. For a copy of the letter that Charter
Communications sends to suspected infringers, see id.
75. Sandoval, supra note 19.
76. Schweizer & Satariano, supra note 9. Note that there are recent indications that these
collaborations have not yet taken effect and that ISPs claim that they might not want to terminate
subscribers' connections under a graduated response program. Greg Sandoval, Six Months Later, No
ISPs Joining RIAA Piracy Fight, CNET NEWS, June 3, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/83o-1o23-3-
10256481-93.html. However, the RIAA still wants to pursue these programs and is still working
steadily with ISPs to reach deals. Id. Additionally, many DMCA takedown notices have been
forwarded to subscribers, with a corresponding deterrent impact. Id.
77. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35, 5 n.15; Comcast Order, supra note 12, 11 45, 54.
78. Webopediacom, Network Management, http://www.webopedia.comfTERMIN/network
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defined as "the top-level administration and maintenance of large
networks, often in areas such as computers or telecommunications, but
not including user terminal equipment."" There are often legitimate
reasons for network providers to manage their networks, such as
protecting subscribers from harmful applications." For example,
Comcast provides in its "Acceptable Use Policy" that it will manage its
network to provide the "best possible broadband Internet experience to
all of its customers," and this includes protecting users from "spam,
viruses, security attacks, network congestion, and other risks and
degradations of service." 8'
Comcast's interference with peer-to-peer file sharing was an
unsuccessful attempt at reasonable network management.2 In its
Comcast Order, the FCC noted other types of network management that
would be reasonable because they target high bandwidth use without
discriminating against content or applications." Using filtering
technology to control the flow of certain types of content is another
controversial example of network management.84
While collaborations between the ISP and the RIAA are not
"network management" in the traditional sense, they should still be
considered network management policies to be evaluated under the
Internet Policy Statement because they are policies regulating the ISP's
membership and the type of content available to its members. Unlike the
other types of network management previously discussed, the ISP-RIAA
collaborations do not apply on a network-wide level or use programs or
protocols to effectively administer internet access. Rather, they will
operate on an individualized basis, targeting users suspected of
infringement. However, despite the collaborations' differences from
traditional methods of network management, the collaborations contain
management.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009); Cisco SYs., INTERNETWORKING TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK 6-1,
http://www.cisco.comlen/US/docs/internetworking/technology/handbook/NM-Basics.pdf ("In general,
network management is a service that employs a variety of tools, applications, and devices to assist
human network managers in monitoring and maintaining networks.").
79. What Is Network Management?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-network-management.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
8o. Kevin Werbach, Only Words, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 128o-8i (2007)-
81. Comcast Acceptable Use Policy for High-Speed Internet Services (2009), http://
www.comcast.net/terms/use/#network [hereinafter "Comcast Acceptable Use Policy"] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2009).
82. Comcast Order, supra note t2, 1.
83. Id. 49.
84. Schleimer, supra note 12, at 144 (noting that AT&T is considering filtering technology); Sarah
M. Preis, Comment, To Regulate or Not to Regulate: The FCC's Authority to Regulate Online
Copyright Infringement Under the Communications Act, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 535, 556-57. Filtering
may also be implemented at the user level, but this type of filtering does not take away the consumer's
choice of content. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REv. 553, 558 (1998) ("[French law] requires information
service providers to offer technical means for users to filter content.").
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other indicia of network management because they regulate the
membership and functionality of the network by suspending and
terminating alleged infringers.t This affects the functionality of the
network for the end user who is accused of copyright infringement.1 It
also affects the functionality of the internet for other users benefiting
from one less user clogging the limited available bandwidth."
Further, like other network management policies, any ISP-RIAA
collaboration would be implemented by those running the network with
little input from the subscribers. The policy to actually terminate or
suspend the internet service of somebody who has been accused of
copyright infringement is the ISP's nuclear option; instead of negotiating
with the alleged offender, decreasing her connection speed, or closing the
port she uses to allegedly infringe copyright, it revokes that person's right
to use that ISP to access the network.
Moreover, the chilling effect of subscribers knowing that the ISP is
collaborating with the RIAA is another form of network management.
Like Comcast's throttling of peer-to-peer file sharers, the in terrorem
effect of these agreements will be used to free up more bandwidth and
alter subscribers' internet usage by deterring would-be peer-to-peer file
sharers.m This will, in turn, improve the functionality of the internet for
other users.
The ISP-RIAA collaborations provide the conditions upon which
one may lose one's status as a member of the network, the activities in
which one may engage, and also reduce network congestion. Therefore,
they fall within the definition of network management, and should be
evaluated for reasonableness under the Internet Policy Statement.
85. This could certainly fit within the framework of providing the highest quality service to
network users and protecting them from harmful congestion. See Comcast Acceptable Use Policy,
supra note 81.
86. See Triplett, supra note 66 ("ISPs want to manage traffic better, [RIAA chairman-CEO Mitch
Bainwol] said, and one way will be to have 'smart pipes' that will effectively know what content is
moving through them. Smart pipes should therefore be able to spot and help stop illegal content.").
87. See Sandoval, supra note 74 (noting the deterrent impact of DMCA takedown notices alone);
Triplett, supra note 66 (noting that "smart pipes," which discriminate against illegal content, would be
a more efficient means of managing traffic than a neutral network of "dumb pipes").
88. For a discussion of the deterrent effect of threats to suspend network privileges, see Feldman
& Nadler, supra note 6o, at 607-
89. I assume here, and throughout this Note, that having fewer users on a network using
bandwidth at any given time improves the browsing experience for other users. See McDowell, supra
note iI ("These electronic traffic jams slow the Internet for most consumers.... Slower speeds
degrade the quality of the service that consumers have paid for . . . .
9o. See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35, 5 n-i5-
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C. ATTEMPTING To REGULATE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT DEPRIVES USERS
OF THE LAWFUL CONTENT OF THEIR CHOICE
Part II.B. argued that the ISP-RIAA agreement should be viewed as
an extreme form of network management and should be subject to
review under the Internet Policy Statement. Additionally, the ISP-RIAA
collaborations should also be subject to the Internet Policy Statement
because, like other forms of network management, the ISP-RIAA
collaborations are likely to deprive internet users of the lawful content of
their choice. Thus, the ISP-RIAA collaborations lead to the very evils
the Internet Policy Statement was designed to prevent.
While ISPs may act to stop users from accessing material that
infringes copyright, they must carefully choose their means. The Comcast
Order created a dichotomy of types of content. As discussed previously,
the FCC set a high bar for network management practices when lawful
content is at issue, but allowed for ISPs to regulate unlawful content,
including content that infringes copyright." However, the FCC provided
no guidelines for how ISPs may regulate copyrighted content. Based on
the strength of the protection afforded to the subscriber's right to use the
applications of her choice and access the lawful content of her choice,
measures aimed at policing copyright infringement must be narrowly
tailored in order to make sure that they do not sweep up lawful content.
Copyright law's fair use defense provides a strong justification for
narrowly-tailored means for stopping copyright infringement. Fair use is
a malleable, four-factored defense premised in part on the justification
that "reasonable appropriations of protected works [are] permissible
when they advance[] the public interest without inflicting unacceptably
grave damage on the copyright owner."92 The fair use inquiry is
sometimes considered "the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright" and requires courts to consider four statutory factors:
(i) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.'
Fair use "is an equitable rule of reason, whose applicability in an
individual case is dependent upon particular facts and their
91. See supra Part I.
92. LITMAN, supra note 3, at 84.
93. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 1o4 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo7). For a further discussion of how to weigh the factors in a
fair use inquiry, see BENKLER, su pra note 25, 31-3.
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interrelationships." 5 While there are precedents, "the cases provide no
definitive specifications regarding the limits of fair use."o
Any network-level attempt to stop people from sharing copyrighted
material runs a serious risk of blocking lawful content because of the
difficulty of determining whether one is making fair use of copyrighted
material. The risk of sweeping up content protected by fair use with a
plan geared to stop copyrighted material is real and has already arisen in
other contexts.97
Consider the example of an ISP choosing to implement filtering
technology. Filtering technology holds the potential to keep people away
not only from illegal or infringing material, but also from lawful content.
Filtering works by either "analyzing packets of data in
transmission ... [and] examin[ing] content against a database of
works ... [or] analyzing the nature of the traffic itself,. . . enabl[ing] ISPs
to block certain applications."" Filtering technology may make mistakes,
and machines are incapable of making the type of difficult analysis that
goes into determining whether a use is lawful. If an ISP chooses to
implement filtering technology, the filtering technology should be
designed in such a way that it does not filter material that is protected as
fair use." It will be impossible to access lawful, fair use protected
material if the filter erroneously stops it. Thus, the filter would deprive
the internet subscriber of lawful content.
Other, indiscriminate means of regulating copyright infringement
cause the same problem: in trying to stop copyright infringement, they
sweep too broadly, depriving users of lawful content. These provisions
make it illegal to circumvent access controls designed to protect
copyrighted works'" and also make it illegal to manufacture devices
designed to circumvent these measures.0 ' Thus, not only is it illegal to
disable the encryption on a protected DVD, but it is also illegal to
produce a program that enables others to disable the encryption. The
DMCA contains no provision expressly allowing for circumvention to
make fair use of a work. 0 2
95. JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE & BERNARD TIMBERG, FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW
AND THE NEW MEDIA 10 (2d ed. 1989).
96. Id. Lawrence and Timberg compare the fair use analysis to other concepts, such as the
"reasonable, prudent man," "due process," "unfair competition," and "equitable settlement." Id.
97. Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 5o7. Filtering technologies
may be subdivided into content inspection and traffic analysis. Preis, supra note 84, at 536. Content
inspection analyzes the content and compares it to a database of works to determine if it infringes
copyright. Id. Traffic analysis allows ISPs to block certain applications. Id. Filtering technology will
erroneously interfere with fair uses unless it is somehow trained to accurately spot a fair use. See id.
98. Preis, supra note 84, at 536.
99. Id- at 55"7.
ioo. LnTMAN, supra note 3, at 152-54 (discussing this example).
101. 17 U.S.C. § i2oi(a)(i)-(2).
102. See id. § 120i; see also LrrMAN, Supra note 3, at 138 (noting that during DMCA drafting
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These provisions exist in tension with fair use,'" because while
access controls are indiscriminate-barring everybody regardless of one's
purpose-"[c]opyrighted works contain protected and unprotected
elements, and access to those works may advance restricted or
unrestricted uses." 04 "In theory,.. . a user who has paid the required
price for access to the work would remain free to circumvent
technological controls that prevented the exercise of fair use and other
user privileges."' 5 But that is theory; in reality, one is more likely to be
deterred from making fair use copies because of the difficulties of
circumventing an access control, especially when the required technology
is illegal and "defending a claim of fair use is expensive."'" As Professor
Lessig put it, "Using code, copyright owners restrict fair use; using the
DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the restrictions
on fair use that they impose through code."" Professor Reidenberg
notes the same problem with technical copy protections that prevent the
owner from making fair use copies.'" The technology does not know that
the user wishes to make legal, fair use of the work, so it does its job and
keeps the user from copying."
As in the case with filtration technologies, access controls, and
technical copy protections, the ISP-RIAA collaborations may
indiscriminately sweep up lawful content, such as fair uses. The principle
of network neutrality is implicated when an ISP enters into an agreement
with the RIAA to police copyright infringement because a high potential
for mistakes and abuse is present. It is exactly this potential that makes a
high standard necessary to determine when an ISP may revoke
negotiations, content industry representatives said that fair use would survive the DMCA but refused
to insert a provision expressly saying that).
io3. For a thorough discussion of the fair use defense in the DMCA, see generally David Nimmer,
A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 710-42 (200o).
104. LITMAN, supra note 3, at 83 (referring to the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions, codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 1201, which make it unlawful to circumvent any technological measure designed to
protect a work); ZrITRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at 15 ("Some argue that broad attempts to embed
copyright protections in technology fall short because the technology cannot easily take into account
possible fair use defenses.").
105. JULIE F. COHEN ET AL.. COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECoNov 609 (2d ed. 2oo6).
io6. LESSIG, supra note I, at ioo (internal quotation marks omitted); see also BENKLER, supra note
2, at 17 ("Different technologies make different kinds of human action and interaction easier or harder
to perform.").
107. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USEs TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DowizN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATVTrY 6o (2004); see Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the
Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, soo Nw. U. L. REv. 655, 710 (2oo6) (referring to structural and fiat
based laws, and noting that "[b]y setting up some structure first-in other words, by making
circumvention technologies difficult to obtain-the DMCA makes the latter 'act' prohibition easier to
enforce").
io8. Reidenberg, supra note 84, at 566.
109. See HART, supra note 43, at 219 (noting that the court in United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.
Supp. 2d IIII, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2oo2), found that the DMCA makes it difficult to engage in fair use);
see also LESSIG, supra note o7; Reidenberg, supra note 84, at 566.
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somebody's internet access in the name of stopping copyright
infringement. Although ISPs, pursuant to the Comcast Order, "may
block transmissions that violate copyright law,""0  the crucial issue
becomes: who determines whether a transmission violates copyright law,
and how does one know that a transmission violates copyright law?
Whether or not any given piece of content being transferred
infringes copyright may seem like common sense or a straightforward
determination, but it is not. It is not always easy to tell if something
violates copyright law because of the complexity of the fair use defense
and of copyright law in general."' One must consider who is in the best
place to make the difficult determination of whether the fair use defense
applies, and who is impartial enough to do it reliably.
In this context, the good faith belief of a paid RIAA representative,
which is not subject to review, does not substitute for the type of analysis
that goes into determining the validity of a fair use claim."' For example,
a representative of the copyright holder would not have been ideally
placed to decide whether 2 Live Crew's cover of Roy Orbison's "Pretty
Woman" was protected as a satire under the fair use doctrine."' A
person transferring a similar fair use parody could conceivably have a
takedown notice forwarded to them under the new collaborations and be
subject to penalties.
Even if the material is not a fair use, the transfer itself might be
protected as fair use. The copyright holder's representative is not ideally
positioned to determine whether the use was for the purpose of creating
and transferring a backup copy to oneself, time or space shifting, a "me
to me" transfer, or otherwise protected as fair use." 4 All of these would
be fair uses,"' but could subject individuals to takedown notices, which
could eventually lead to one losing one's internet connection under the
proposed collaborations. Because fair use is a valid defense to copyright
infringement, copyright holders must appear as the plaintiffs in copyright
infringement lawsuits, arguing that the use was infringing. Allowing the
ilo. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 31 (emphasis added).
iii. See LITMAN, supra note 3, at 179 (proposing a revision of copyright law so that it is not a law
that only copyright lawyers can decipher and follow).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(v) (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo7) (providing that the takedown notice must
specify that the copyright holder has a good faith belief that the material is infringing). For an example
of the type of notice the RIAA will send to the ISP under the new ISP-RIAA collaboration, see
Sandoval, supra note 73.
113. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,572 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
2 Live Crew's satire of Pretty Woman was protected under the fair use defense. It is conceivable,
though, that under the RIAA-ISP's new collaboration, an RIAA representative seeing the transfer of
2 Live Crew's Pretty Woman would think that this was a transfer of a file that made unauthorized use
of Roy Orbison and William Dees's original work, and would send a DMCA takedown notice to the
Isp.
114. Preis, supra note 84, at 557.
S 5r. Id.
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copyright holder's good faith belief of a lack of fair use to lead to
termination of a subscriber's internet defeats the purpose of the fair use
defense by taking away the subscriber's ability to assert the defense in
court.
The standard for an ISP to discriminate against users it claims are
violating copyright law must be high because it is difficult to determine
whether a violation has occurred. Any potential collaboration that aims
to block content that violates copyright law must not deter the subscriber
from (a) accessing the lawful content of her choice, (b) using the
applications of her choice, and (c) using the legal devices of her choice.
The two categories of content that the FCC distinguishes -infringing and
non-infringing-are interconnected. Buried within a network filled with
packets of non-infringing data, there may be packets of data that infringe
copyright because "[c]yberspace.. . enables beneficial as well as
nefarious activities to thrive."" 6 In seeking to stop the nefarious
(infringing) activities, copyright holders and ISPs must not stop
beneficial (lawful) activities.
D. THE PROPOSED COLLABORATIONS VIOLATE THE INTERNET POLICY
STATEMENT BECAUSE OF THEIR SOLE RELIANCE ON DMCA TAKEDOWN
NoTICEs
As previously discussed, it is extremely difficult to determine
whether a subscriber has infringed a copyright. Any ISP-RIAA
collaborations should be subject to the strictures of the Internet Policy
Statement, which requires a high standard to ensure that subscribers are
not denied access to lawful content. The currently proposed ISP-RIAA
collaborations would not withstand scrutiny under the Internet Policy
Statement because of their high potential for mistakes and low burden of
proof. The proposed ISP-RIAA collaborations rely solely on RIAA-
generated DMCA takedown notices. As discussed above, the current
proposal is that DMCA takedown notices will be sent by copyright
holders to ISPs, and forwarded by the ISP to the allegedly infringing
subscriber."' The graduated response program could lead to a subscriber
losing her internet connection.
This proposal is problematic precisely because a DMCA takedown
notice is no guarantee that somebody is actually infringing copyright.
The DMCA takedown notice is not so precise; it merely requires that the
copyright holder identify the material that is claimed to be infringing and
has a "good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
116. Reidenberg, supra note 84, at 556.
I17. See supra Part II.A.2.
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complained of is not authoried by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law." 8
DMCA takedown notices are not a reliable means of distinguishing
between lawful and infringing content because DMCA takedown notices
are commonly faulty."' Takedown notices have previously been used in
two situations: subpoenaing the identity of alleged infringers, and asking
online service providers to remove infringing material hosted on their
servers. The potential for mistakes and abuse already presented by
takedown notices in these contexts buttresses the argument that DMCA
takedown notices should not be sufficient proof of infringement to
trigger internet termination under the new ISP-RIAA collaborations.
The first area where takedown notices have proven faulty is in the
context of subpoenas. The DMCA provides a procedure where the
copyright holder may subpoena the identity of an allegedly infringing file
sharer. 20 To subpoena the identity of an alleged file sharer, one must
fulfill the requirements set out in 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)."' The process of
subpoenaing the identity of an alleged infringer includes filing a copy of a
DMCA takedown notice,"' which is the only subpoena requirement that
links an alleged infringer to allegedly infringing content." 3
These subpoenas have proven far from perfect at identifying alleged
file sharers. The RIAA has, in the past, made outrageous mistakes and
gaffes in subpoenaing the identities of different IP addresses and admits
that its internet copyright enforcers are not required to listen to the
complete song before determining if it is infringing.2 4 The RIAA has
I18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2oo6 & Supp. 2007).
i19. See infra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2) provides that one must file a copy of a takedown notification, a
proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to
obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose
of protecting rights under the Copyright Act.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A) provides that the request must include "a copy of a notification
described in subsection (c)(3)(A)." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) provides the requirements for the
DMCA's takedown notices, including, among other things, that the copyright holder identify the
material that is claimed to be infringing and has a "good faith belief that the use of the material in the
manner is not authorized by the copyright holder, its agent, or the law." (emphasis added).
123. See id. § 5 12(h)(2)-(3). Under the DMCA, in order to get an ISP to actually reveal the
identity of the user, the RIAA must file a request, including a copy of a notification described in
§ 512(c)(3)(A), a proposed subpoena, and "a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for
which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information
will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under this title." Id. § 512(h).
124. Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, CNET News, May 12, 2oo3,
http://news.cnet.com/2ioo-1025-3-1001095.html. Many of the RIAA's mistakes are catalogued. See
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown
Demands, http://www.eff.org/files/2oo30926_unsafe-harbors.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Unsafe Harbors] (cataloguing mistaken and abusive takedown demands, including a subpoena
directed at a Romanian student who was out of the country at the time of the alleged infringement and
did not own a computer); see also Schweizer & Satariano, supra note 9 (noting that the RIAA has sued
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dismissed some of its complaints upon finding out that, for instance, the
defendant did not own a computer and was not in the United States at
the time of the alleged infringement, or only owned a Macintosh
computer incapable of running the file sharing program she allegedly
used.' Notably, the RIAA sued a "66-year-old artist, educator and
grandmother, Sarah Seabury Ward... accus[ing her] of illegally
downloading and sharing more than 2000 songs online, including I'm a
Thug by Trick Daddy.""' The takedown notices are the only part of the
subpoena process linking an alleged infringer to allegedly infringing
action, and these examples show that the RIAA does not adequately
investigate before generating these baseless subpoenas.
Takedown notices are also erroneously used outside of the
subpoena process. Under the DMCA, ISPs are entitled to safe harbors
from copyright infringement liability for certain activities if they meet
statutory requirements.' The second, third, and fourth safe harbors
provide online service providers' 8 relief from liability for, respectively,
system caching, information residing on systems or networks at direction
of users, and information location tools." 9 These safe harbors are subject
to many conditions, including that upon receiving a takedown notice,
"the online service provider responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification
of claimed infringement."' 30
Precisely because the ISP's exemption from liability is conditioned
upon expeditious response to the takedown notice, DMCA takedown
notices tend to have an in terrorem effect on the ISP whereby, regardless
of their merits, they have been utilized to pressure ISPs to remove
content with "dubious copyright infringement claims."' 3' The RIAA, in
generating the notice, may be mistaken about the identity of the infringer
a dead woman).
125. Unsafe Harbors, supra note 124, at 2; see MATTHEw RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE
CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 214-16 (2o07) (documenting examples of absurd and
erroneous RIAA lawsuits).
126. RIMMER, supra note 125, at 215.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d).
128. Online service providers are defined at 17 U.S.C. § 512(k). For the § 512(a) safe harbor for
transmission of data, the term "service provider" means "an entity offering the transmission, routing,
or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a
user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or
received." Id. § 512(k)(I). The type of ISPs involved in this RIAA collaboration fall within this
definition. The second, third, and fourth safe harbors (§ 512(b)-(d)) are subject to a different
definition of online service provider: "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator
of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A)." Id. § 512(k)(I)(B).
129. Id. § 512(b)-(d).
130. Id. § 512(b)(2)(E).
131. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I, 12 (2003).
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or the copyright status of the work." The takedown notice does not
require the ISP to investigate whether or not an infringement has
occurred; rather, the DMCA incentivizes the ISP to immediately remove
the allegedly infringing content to maintain its safe harbor status.' Like
the RIAA, the ISP has no incentive to discover if there is a valid
copyright defense or an actual claim for infringement.'34 Doing so would
be costly, would not be an expeditious response, and could lead to a loss
of safe harbor status. For instance, Google removed links to a website
that was critical of the Church of Scientology after receiving a DMCA
takedown notice, even though it recognized that the actual copyright
infringement claim might not have any merit.' YouTube removed a
video of an eighteen-month-old baby dancing to a Prince song."' These
are not isolated incidents; examples abound of erroneous DMCA
takedown notices that were clear examples of fair use.'37 Further, there
are many false positives, where the copyright holder is convinced that an
innocent person is infringing copyright. 38
To survive FCC scrutiny after the Comcast Order, the collaborations
"should further a critically important interest and be narrowly or
carefully tailored to serve that interest."' 39 We may assume arguendo that
stopping copyright infringement is a critically important interest, as is
reducing network congestion. 40 We may also assume that having the
RIAA identify potential copyright holders and having the ISP suspend or
terminate their internet actually furthers that interest.'4 ' However, the
ISP-RIAA collaborations fail under the Internet Policy Statement's
principles because it is not narrowly tailored. While the RIAA targets
only those whom it has a good faith belief are infringing, a good faith
132. See id. (noting the in terrorem effect of the DMCA takedown notice); see also supra note 124.
133. KENNEDY, supra note 62, at 148.
134. See Mark Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1386 (2004) ("The fact that these intermediaries do not
bear the full social cost of taking down challenged content means that enforcing copyright law by
requiring them to do so creates negative externalities, tilting the law too far in favor of copyright
owners.").
135. Netanel, supra note 131, at 12-13.
136. LESSIG, supra note i, at 1-5; Nate Anderson, Universal Demands Takedown of Homemade
Dancing Toddler Clip; EFF Sues, ARs TECHNICA July 25, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
2007/o7/universal-demands-takedown-of-homemade-dancing-toddler-clip-eff-sues.ars.
137. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 1421 n.293 (collecting examples); Anderson, supra
note 136; Unsafe Harbors, supra note 124, at 1-2.
138. See generally Michael Piatek et al., Challenges and Directions for Monitoring P2P File
Sharing Networks-or-Why My Printer Received a DMCA Takedown Notice (2oo8), http://
dmca.cs.washington.eduldmca hotseco8.pdf (discussing the different ways of detecting one's IP
address and why current tracking technology produces a high incidence of false positives).
139. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 47.
140. See Yoo, supra note ii, at 1862-63 (discussing the unprecedented demands on networks).
141. This, however, is arguable, given the common incidence of mistaken DMCA takedown
notices. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
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belief is not enough. As discussed previously, takedown notices often
sweep up non-infringing content, and there is no neutral adjudicator to
decide difficult issues like fair use.'42 Takedown notices are flawed, easy
to generate, often meritless, and an inadequate substitute for a full trial
on the merits or even a motion for summary judgment. An RIAA
member's good faith belief should not substitute for a careful weighing of
the factors and analysis of precedent. This collaboration is not narrowly
tailored to regulate copyright infringement.
The ISP-RIAA collaborations, which rely on DMCA takedown
notices, violate the Internet Policy Statement because they will deprive
subscribers of the lawful content of their choice using a dangerously
inaccurate procedure. The DMCA takedown notices have caused
numerous problems in the past, and the RIAA would continue to use
them in its new collaborations. A situation like this, where common
mistakes and inaccuracies in DMCA takedown notices will lead to
networks blocking users from lawful content, is unacceptable, especially
considering that "some content owners have been sending [takedown
notices] with reckless abandon and which need not even meet the
standards of Rule ii."" Blockage of a subscriber's access to lawful
content will occur merely because the RIAA representative had a good
faith belief that the subscriber was a copyright infringer.
Regardless of the reasons, RIAA representatives have, in the past,
proven themselves incapable of sending takedown notices without
making mistakes. Under this notice and takedown regime, both the
RIAA and the ISP know that it does not matter if there is an actual
infringement because expeditious response is required. ISPs become
even less motivated to determine if material is actually infringing because
they are now entering the content market and have aligned business
interests with the RIAA.w' Knowing that ISPs are not motivated to
investigate the validity of takedown notices, RIAA representatives are
further de-incentivized from careful investigation. Using DMCA
takedown notices in the ISP-RIAA collaborations will only lead to more
subscribers being denied access to lawful content based on faulty
takedown notices. Neither the ISPs nor the RIAA have any incentive to
be careful, but the takedown notices will lead to harsh consequences for
end users, which violate the Internet Policy Statement.
142. See supra Part H2.C.
143. Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 1421 (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. Ii).
144. Triplett, supra note 66; Changing Marketplace, supra note 9.
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III. REQUIRING ACTUAL PROOF OF INFRINGEMENT HARMONIZES THE
FCC's POSITION WITH THE DMCA
The previous Part established that the Internet Policy Statement
should be applied to the ISP-RIAA collaborations because they are an
extreme form of network management, and also because they endanger
the subscriber's right to access the lawful content of her choice. It further
established that the ISP-RIAA collaborations are invalid under the
Internet Policy Statement. This Part argues that the Internet Policy
Statement should be interpreted in a novel way to accord with Professor
Nimmer's interpretation of the DMCA's repeat infringer policy,
requiring either actual proof of infringement or that a user be
adjudicated to have committed copyright infringement before an ISP
revokes service. It further applies Professor Nimmer's standard for
repeat infringement to invalidate the ISP-RIAA collaborations.
A. BACKGROUND OF DMCA SAFE HARBORS AND THE REPEAT INFRINGER
POLICY
The DMCA contains four safe harbors for "online service
providers." 45 As previously discussed, the safe harbors provide that the
ISPs are not liable for copyright infringement when they engage in
certain activities."46 In order to maintain eligibility for these safe harbors,
the ISPs must fulfill certain requirements, including having "adopted and
reasonably implemented ... a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders ... who
are repeat infringers." 47
The obligation to terminate repeat infringers is an example of using
past misbehavior as a proxy for preventing future misbehavior."4' The
145. Online service providers are defined in the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 12(k)(I)(A)-(B) (20o6
& Supp. 2007). For service providers merely acting as conduits and seeking the § 512(a) safe harbor,
"'service provider' means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received." Id. § 512(k)(I)(A).
"This broad definition includes network services companies such as Internet service providers (ISPs)."
FAQ About DMCA Safe Harbor, http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca5I2/faq.cgi#QID'27 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2009). For the other safe harbors of section 512(b)-(d), "the term 'service provider' means a
provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an
entity described in subparagraph (A)." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(I)(B).
146. See discussion supra notes 127-30.
147- 17 U.S.C. § 5 12(i). The ISP must also accommodate and not interfere with "standard technical
measures." Id. § 512(i)(I)(B). Copyright owners use standard technological measures to protect
copyrighted works. Id. § 5 12(i)(2). The § 512(b), (c), and (d) safe harbors also require as a condition
that the ISP respond to DMCA takedown notices. See id. §512(c)(3), (b)(2)(E), (c)(s)(C), (d)(3).
148. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.Io(A) (Matthew Bender
rev. ed. 2oo9); Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 269
(2oo6) ("This requirement suggested a role of bouncer not simply vis-A-vis a particular set of
information in controversy. Rather, it anticipated identifying bad people rather than just bad acts, and
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policy to terminate repeat infringers is a "prophylactic against future acts
of infringement by actors whose past conduct renders them suspect." 49 In
enacting the DMCA, Congress noted that "those who repeatedly or
flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect for the
intellectual property rights of others should know that there is a realistic
threat of losing that access."'5s
Unfortunately, the DMCA "is bereft of ... details for how [the
repeat infringer policy] should be implemented.""' Courts have similarly
failed to provide guidance as to the meaning of "repeat infringers,"' and
"[n]o one seems to know what makes one a 'repeat infringer."" 53 Because
allegations often turn out to be untrue, Professor Nimmer, author of the
leading copyright treatise Nimmer on Copyright, posits that one is not an
"infringer" for purposes of the repeat infringers policy unless one has
either been adjudicated to have committed copyright infringement or the
ISP has actual knowledge that one has committed infringement.'54
Professor Nimmer's standard recognizes that allegations are not
enough, noting that multiple takedown notices do not suffice to render
somebody an "infringer" within the meaning of the DMCA's repeat
infringer policy.' This argument has an intuitive appeal, because
"[s]urely a recidivist writer of Harry Potter book reports is not a 'repeat
infringer' merely because Scholastic sends two mistaken cease and desist
letters."'"6 While multiple notifications against a non-infringer do not
make somebody into an infringer, an infringer is still an infringer
regardless of whether notices have been filed against her. This standard
it encouraged ISPs and OSPs to act against those people, truly serving as bouncers the way bouncers at
night clubs and bars do, ejecting recidivist troublemakers.").
149. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.io(A)(2); see Zittrain, supra note 148, at 269.
150. H.R. REP. No. Io5-551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998).
151- 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.Io(A)(2).
152. Andres Sawicki, Comment, Repeat Infringement in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (2006).
153. Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 1420.
154. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.Io(B)(3).
155. Id. § 12B.Io(B)(3)(b). As Professor Nimmer notes,
We have already seen that A and B must be treated as infringers even if someone
neglected to file a notification of claimed infringement about their conduct. The converse
question remains whether C and D need to be treated as infringers by dint of multiple
notifications of claimed infringement about their conduct.
The answer is negative. Users A-D must be judged on their own merits. It neither
suffices to treat any as an "infringer" for repeat infringer purposes that a copyright owner
has filed a notification of claimed infringement against her, nor does it derogate from her
status as a known infringer that a copyright owner has failed to file a notification of claimed
infringement against her. In short, those notifications, albeit crucial to the statutory scheme
for determining past infringement, do not meaningfully contribute to Section 512's
disposition of future infringement in the policy that it mandates.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
156. Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 1421 nI.293 (discussing similar examples).
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puts no weight on allegations, and places all the weight on (a) actual
knowledge, or (b) adjudication of infringement.
Congress's language in the DMCA House Report also counsels
towards using Professor Nimmer's standard, as opposed to the alleged
infringement standard. It is not "flagrant abuse"'" of the intellectual
property rights of others to be repeatedly accused of copyright
infringement with baseless claims, but it is flagrant disrespect for the
intellectual property rights of others to commit copyright infringement
multiple times. The recidivist Harry Potter book report writer discussed
above has not acted in such a way so as to justify her internet connection
being terminated. DMCA takedown notices are commonly faulty.'
Merely receiving two or three takedown notices is not enough to make
one into a "repeat infringer," especially given the complexity of the fair
use defense.' Repeat accusations do not a repeat infringer make.
It must be noted that the DMCA merely provides when the ISP
must terminate the "repeat infringer."'6" Professor Nimmer explains that
there may be practical incentives for ISPs to terminate repeat infringers
without having actual knowledge or proof that the person has been
adjudicated to commit infringement. For example, it can be expensive to
have a customer who is repeatedly accused of copyright infringement
because there are costs associated with taking down allegedly infringing
content and, if the customer challenges the takedown, potentially putting
it back up.' 6' "The only point ... is that Congress did not command that
providers must determine in advance where that point will be reached,
through mandating its inclusion in a repeat infringers policy."' 62 The
implications for this Note of the ISP's economic incentives to terminate
alleged infringers, as opposed to actual infringers, will be briefly
discussed infra Part V.A. However, an ISP's desire to terminate an
alleged infringer for economic reasons is not relevant to whether
somebody actually is a repeat infringer, or an infringer at all. ' Rather,
an ISP's extra costs associated with clearing up groundless accusations
should have no impact on a subscriber's internet connection.64
157. H.R. REP. No. 805-55 I, Part 2, at 61 (1998).
158. See supra Part 1IB.
159. See supra Part II.C.
16o. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.io.
161. Id. § 12B.Io(B)(3)(b).
162. Id.
163. ISPs are unsure of how to implement the repeat infringer policy. See Greg Sandoval, Is A T& T
Violating the DMCA by Not Booting 'Repeat Infringers?', CNET NEWS, Apr. 1, 2009, http://
news.cnet.com/83oI-1o23-3 -l o2o8747-93.html. While AT&T sends notices of alleged infringement to
its customers, AT&T, consistent with the arguments in this Note, has said that it is not AT&T's role to
determine whose connection may be terminated as a repeat infringer. Id. However, others, such as
Cox and Comcast, are cooperating in the RIAA's antipiracy campaign. Sandoval, supra note 72.
164. There are other proposed solutions that keep the burden of determining whether something
infringes off of the ISP and still provide some protection to the subscriber. See Lemley & Reese, supra
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B. THE FCC SHOULD USE PROFESSOR NIMMER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
DMCA's REPEAT INFRINGEMENT STANDARD WHEN EVALUATING ISP-
RIAA COLLABORATIONS
As discussed supra Part II.C., any collaboration that would
terminate or suspend internet connections of subscribers should be held
to a high standard to avoid depriving subscribers of access to lawful
content. The FCC should adopt Professor Nimmer's interpretation of the
DMCA's repeat infringer policy for the following reasons, which will be
discussed in more detail below. First, it shares the same practical goal as
the ISP-RIAA collaborations. Second, it accords with the language of the
FCC's Comcast Order. Third, it is consistent with the Internet Policy
Statement's principle of providing users access to the lawful content of
their choice, particularly in light of the difficulty of determining fair use
claims. Finally, it is consistent with congressional intent to encourage the
growth and popularity of the internet through the safe harbor approach,
and not to expose ISPs merely engaged in transmission to a notice and
takedown regime.
First, the FCC should adopt the DMCA's repeat infringer standard
in evaluating the ISP-RIAA collaborations because it shares the same
practical goal and balances the same interests as that of the proposed
ISP-RIAA collaborations. Like an ISP-RIAA collaboration, the
DMCA's repeat infringer policy seeks to stop future acts of infringement
by people whose past actions render them suspect.'6 ' These people, who
have shown disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others, are
denied access.'6 However, the DMCA's repeat infringer standard, as
articulated by Professor Nimmer, both decreases the burdens on ISPs of
implementing the repeat infringer standard-not having to cancel the
subscribers who have only been alleged to infringe-and, importantly,
protects the subscribers from having this policy fall too harshly upon
them. Professor Nimmer's standard does not overvalue the interests of
the copyright holder, and the subscribers know that they will not have
their accounts terminated because of mere allegations. Given the high
incidence of faulty DMCA takedown notices,'6 this is an important
note 134, at 1421 ("Keying the termination obligation to an administrative finding would protect the
due process rights of those wrongfully accused of infringement without rendering the repeat infringer
provision virtually ineffective."). Professors Lemley and Reese argue for a middle ground between
Professor Nimmer's current interpretation and the RIAA's interpretation, positing that an
administrative body should independently determine whether the content infringes. Id. They posit that
an administrative body should independently determine whether the content infringes. Id. The
administrative solution advocated by Professors Lemley and Reese is outside the scope of this Note.
However, New Zealand and France both have, to some extent, attempted to use the administrative
body approach. See infra Part IV.
165. Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 1421.
166. See H.R. REP. No. Io5-551, Part 2, at 6- (1998).
I67. See supra Part .11f
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assurance. The DMCA's repeat infringement standard, as interpreted by
Professor Nimmer, accomplishes the same goal as the ISP-RIAA
collaborations, but-consistent with the principles of the FCC's Internet
Policy Statement'"-offers more protection to subscribers than the
current ISP-RIAA collaborations. Specifically, the DMCA's repeat
infringement standard offers greater protection to the subscriber's ability
to access the lawful content and applications of her choice.'
Further, the DMCA's higher standard of protection should be
adopted in evaluating the ISP-RIAA collaborations because it is
consistent with the language of the Internet Policy Statement, as
interpreted in the Comcast Order. Notably, the FCC stated that ISPs may
block transmissions that violate copyright law."o The FCC did not say
that ISPs may regulate content that the RIAA has a good faith belief
violates copyright law. Nor did the FCC say that the ISPs may regulate
content that the RIAA has repeatedly had a good faith belief violates
copyright law. If the ISP seeks to stop a former copyright infringer from
using its network to infringe again, it is useless to block former "alleged"
infringers. Many alleged infringers are never proven to have infringed,
and the difficulty of determining a copyright violation speaks to this
problem."' The ISPs would be greatly overburdened by sanctioning all
alleged violators, and doing so would sweep too widely under the
Internet Policy Statement.7 2
Professor Nimmer's standard is also consistent with the Internet
Policy Statement's principle of allowing subscribers access to the lawful
content of their choice. In only mandating termination of people who
have been adjudicated to commit infringement or of whom the ISP has
actual knowledge of infringement, Congress deterred copyright
infringement but allowed non-infringers to use the internet undisturbed.
Like the FCC in its Comcast Order, the DMCA's repeat infringer policy,
as interpreted by Professor Nimmer, draws a clear line between
infringing and non-infringing actions. As to the former, the ISP can
terminate the account; as to the latter, the ISP does not have to terminate
the account.'73 The FCC draws this same line in the Internet Policy
Statement and its Comcast Order. By stating that ISPs may block
transmissions that violate copyright law but simultaneously providing
strong protection to lawful content, the FCC narrowly tailors the
methods an ISP may use to block copyright infringement, just as the
DMCA does, in order to protect those lawfully using the internet.
168. See supra Part II.
i69. See Internet Policy Statement, supra note 35.
170. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 50.
171. See supra Part I.C.
172. See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
173. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.iO(B)(3); see also Sandoval, supra note 163.
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The DMCA's repeat infringer policy is also consistent with the
previous discussion of fair use and how commonly DMCA takedown
notices are erroneous. 4 Because determining whether a copyright
infringement has occurred is often a difficult process, the DMCA
insulates subscribers from mandatory termination unless somebody has
actually made that difficult determination."' It neither requires ISPs to
investigate claimed or alleged infringements, nor relies solely on the
good faith belief of copyright holders. But if an ISP is informed that
someone has actually infringed or has been adjudicated to infringe-not
just been accused of infringing-the ISP must terminate that account in
order to maintain its safe harbor.'-'
Moreover, the DMCA's repeat infringer termination policy, like the
Internet Policy Statement, is part of the legislative scheme that
encouraged the growth and popularity of the internet. As long as the ISP
fulfills the DMCA's requirements, the DMCA protects it from liability
for the actions of its subscriber."' This encourages innovation and
investment on the ISP's part."' Congress could have taken many
different routes instead of these broad exemptions. For instance, it is
easy to imagine a system where an ISP would be held strictly liable for all
of the actions of its users."' This could have led to a system of
overdeterrence, but would have drastically reduced copyright
infringement and free expression." ISPs, seeking to avoid being sued,
would actively police infringement and terminate the accounts of
subscribers upon minimal evidence of infringement.'8 ' Ultimately,
Congress chose the safe harbor approach in the DMCA, as it did in other
contexts, such as ISPs' defamation liability under the Communications
Decency Act.' 2 The DMCA safe harbors avoid overdeterrence8 3 and
174. See supra Part lI.B-C.
175. See supra Part III.A.
176. See supra Part.III.A.
177. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of these requirements.
178. See ZrrfRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at i19 (noting that "the scheme reflects a balance" and
that online service providers could have "stopped offering ... services for fear of crushing liability
under a different legal configuration"); Jennifer Bretan. Harboring Doubts About the Efficacy of § 512
Immunity Under the DMCA, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 43, 43 (2003) ("Without some measure of
protection against potentially crushing liability, ISPs could no longer afford to provide the
technological backbone that now supports the Internet. Rather than continue its progression, absent
structured immunity, the growth of the Internet might falter as bankrupted ISPs slowly disappear from
the digital landscape." (footnote omitted)).
179. See generally Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 917
(2oo2).
i8o. See ZrrrAiN, FuTURE, supra note 23, at 119; Hamdani, supra note 179, at 918.
181. This is an example of overdeterrence. See Hamdani, supra note 179, at 921. This "unprompted
enforcement" could lead to beneficial uses being stifled by ISPs. ZrrrRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at
120.
182. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). Similar overdeterrence would occur in the defamation context if ISPs
did not have a safe harbor. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., I29 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. tc97);
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preserve the open character of the internet by requiring that a copyright
holder must affirmatively come forward and declare that an infringing
act has occurred before the ISP must remove the materialt
As part of that broader legislative scheme, ISPs have incentives to
remove or disable access to all allegedly infringing material, but the
DMCA is much less permissive about when an ISP must terminate an
account. To remove the possibility of "crushing liability,""' Congress
prescribed the circumstances when an ISP must either terminate the
accounts of repeat infringers or face liability. The balance that Congress
struck in the DMCA, as interpreted by Professor Nimmer, is consistent
with the Internet Policy Statement because Congress implicitly
recognized that termination upon anything short of actual knowledge or
adjudication of infringement would jeopardize subscribers' rights to
access lawful content and would lead to overdeterrence. It would have
been easy for Congress, in enacting the DMCA, to provide a policy for
terminating the accounts of "alleged repeat infringers" or "claimed
repeat infringers." Notably, while Congress used the words "alleged" and
"claimed" many times in the DMCA,'" it did not do so in the repeat
infringer termination policy.'87 Using the words "alleged" or "claimed" in
the repeat infringer context would have been consistent with the notice
and takedown regime, where an allegation is enough to require the ISP
to act expeditiously to remove the infringing content.'m However, in
failing to provide for mandatory termination of "suspected," "alleged,"
or "claimed" infringers, Congress apparently realized that infringement
is difficult to judge and conduct that is allegedly infringing may not
actually be infringing. No amount of takedown notices should be able to
convert accessing lawful content of one's choice into copyright
infringement, or to convert a law-abiding citizen into an infringer.
Finally, requiring past adjudication or actual knowledge of
infringement-instead of the ISP-RIAA collaborations' alleged
infringement standard-harmonizes the new agreement with
congressional intent in the DMCA because Congress has already
indicated that it did not want to subject ISPs engaged only in
transmission of data to the notice and takedown regime. That is, ISPs
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998). Note that ISPs are referred to as
"interactive computer services" in the Communications Decency Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
183. See Hamdani, supra note 179, at 916.
184. ZrTRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at i19-20. Interestingly, under the Communications
Decency Act, an ISP would not be liable even if it had knowledge of the defamatory statement. See
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-34.
185. ZrrrRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 23, at i19.
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
87. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.Io(B)(3)(b).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E).
89. See 17 U.S.C§- 5 512(a).
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merely acting as conduits for data-as ISPs like Comcast do when people
use them for peer-to-peer file sharing-do not have to act expeditiously
to remove infringing content because they are not storing it or hosting it.
This is because an ISP acting merely as a conduit for information "ha[s]
no capacity to police copyright material on its subscribers' computers"
and cannot lose safe harbor status for failing to do so.'" In Verizon
Internet Services v. RIAA, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
"[n]o matter what information the copyright owner may provide, the ISP
can neither 'remove' nor 'disable access to' the infringing material
because that material is not stored on the ISP's servers."' 9 ' The current
RIAA-ISP plan would have ISPs engaged only in transmission of data
terminating or suspending users' accounts, and this goes far beyond the
balance Congress struck in the DMCA.
While the DMCA was passed in 1998,192 years before the FCC's
Internet Policy Statement and Comcast Order, the DMCA's repeat
infringer policy reflects a similar balance between letting ISPs police
their subscribers' behavior in some circumstances, and allowing the
subscriber to access the lawful content of her choice. The DMCA's
standard, as interpreted by Professor Nimmer, is consistent with the
Internet Policy Statement and the Comcast Order because it places a
premium on people's ability to access the lawful content of their choice,
while recognizing that in some instances, ISPs may act to stop future
copyright infringement. In light of their similar purposes and policies, the
FCC should use the DMCA's repeat infringer standard to harmonize the
principles of the Internet Policy Statement, the Comcast Order, and ISPs'
efforts to curb copyright infringement.
C. THE ISP-RIAA COLLABORATIONs FAIL UNDER THE DMCA's REPEAT
INFRINGER STANDARD
Part III.C. made the case for applying Professor Nimmer's
interpretation of the DMCA's repeat infringer policy to the ISP-RIAA
collaborations. Professor Nimmer's interpretation provides that ISPs
need proof of an adjudication or actual knowledge of copyright
infringement to terminate a subscriber under that policy.' 3 This section
applies Professor Nimmer's interpretation to the proposed ISP-RIAA
collaborations, and concludes that the FCC should invalidate the ISP-
190. RIMMER, supra note 125, at 194; see Verizon Internet Servs. v. RIAA, 351 F.3d 1229, 1235
(D.C. Cir. 2003); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (lacking a notice and takedown provision).
191. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d at 1235; see RIMMER, supra note 125, at 194.
192. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); see also
LUMAN, supra note 3.
193- 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 12B.Io(B)(3)-
265
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
RIAA collaborations because the proposed ISP-RIAA collaborations
allow for terminations upon a lesser showing.194
If these ISP-RIAA collaborations materialize as proposed, the FCC
should invalidate them using Professor Nimmer's interpretation of the
DMCA's standard because these deals rely on the RIAA sending
multiple DMCA takedown notices to the ISP. Multiple alleged infringing
acts are not enough to justify a termination under the DMCA because
allegations are often unfounded. As discussed above, it is difficult to tell
whether an allegation of infringement based on a good faith belief
actually presents a valid claim for infringement, most notably because of
the fair use defense. Similarly, multiple allegations of copyright
infringement should not be enough to lead to one's internet connection
being terminated under the ISP-RIAA agreements. This is why actual
knowledge of infringement or past adjudication of infringement should
be required.
While the DMCA's standard would not explicitly prohibit it, the
ISPs also should not suspend subscribers' access based on mere RIAA
allegations. It may not technically be against the DMCA's repeat
infringer standard if the ISP suspends a user's internet access (as
opposed to terminating it). A suspension is, of course, less than a
termination, so the repeat infringer standard is not directly implicated.
However, if the suspension occurred as a result of multiple allegations, it
still violates the Internet Policy Statement by potentially depriving the
user of lawful content. Because of the potentially erroneous takedown
notices and the ISP and RIAA's lack of incentive to carefully investigate
fair use claims, any agreement allowing for suspensions should still be
invalid despite the lack of a complete termination. Like a complete
termination, a suspension based on allegations may still deprive a user of
the lawful content of her choice.
IV. ISP COLLABORATIONs ARE THE NEW METHOD OF CURBING
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The previous Parts have shown that the ISP-RIAA collaborations
fail under the Internet Policy Statement and under Professor Nimmer's
interpretation of the DMCA's repeat infringer policy. This Part briefly
notes that ISP collaborations are the new method of curbing both
copyright infringement and network congestion, and are becoming a
worldwide problem. It also highlights their common danger: they may
suspend or terminate a subscriber's internet connection, but rely on mere
allegations of infringement.
During this "digital moment,"' the problems of online copyright
infringement and network congestion will not disappear. As to copyright
'94. See supra Part II.A.2.
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infringement, it will continue because copyright law is an area of law with
which people commonly do not understand or comply."' Copyright law
simply criminalizes a large portion of the American population." As to
network congestion, because of the internet's capability of facilitating
both legal and illegal downloads, network operators will continue
working to find ways to reduce congestion. While there are other
options to curb network congestion which would also slow peer-to-peer
file sharing-which the FCC highlighted in the Comcast Order'"-the
new collaborations in the United States and evidence from around the
world show that file sharers are likely to be targeted through ISPs'
collaborations with the recording industry.7 As ISPs further develop
their content offerings, these collaborative programs are unlikely to
subside.20'
In France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, ISPs are either
being pressured or are freely agreeing to act as third-party enforcers for
copyright holders. In France, legislation was recently passed that would
require "ISPs to blacklist repeat offenders, suspending their Internet
access for up to a year."2 o2 This law had the potential to lead to sanctions,
such as imprisonment, and required the participation of a newly-created
government agency." However, this law was recently declared
unconstitutional by the French Conseil Constitutionnel, which held that
freedom of speech and the presumption of innocence required a court
order before blacklisting an internet subscriber." The Conseil
195. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 5, at 151-52.
196. LrrMAN, supra note 3, at 179; see LESSIG, supra note 107, at 201-02 (noting that overregulation
turns people into criminals or law breakers, and that "[t]wenty million Americans have come of age
since the Internet introduced this different idea of 'sharing.' We need to be able to call these twenty
million Americans 'citizens,' not 'felons."'). One commentator estimated that there are twenty-billion
illegal music downloads per year. See Schleimer, supra note 12, at 140.
197. LESSIG, supra note 1o7, at 201-02; LESSIG, supra note i (describing the No Electronic Theft
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, III Stat. 2678 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17, i8,
and 28 U.S.C.), which criminalizes file sharing in some circumstances); Cheng, supra note 1o7, at 697.
198. See Yoo, supra note ii, at 1862-63; McDowell, supra note ii (discussing congestion problems
and network level solutions).
199. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
200. See Triplett, supra note 66.
201. Id.; Schleimer, supra note 12, at 144 ("ISPs,. . . for competitive reasons, must begin licensing
and distributing entertainment content, or risk being trampled by the competition."); Changing
Marketplace, supra note 9.
202. AFP, supra note 18; AFP, Top Legal Body Strikes Down Anti-Piracy Law, FRANCE 24, June
10, 2009, http://www.france2 4 .comlen/2oo9o6Io-top-legal-body-strikes-down-anti-piracy-law-hadopi-
constitutional-council-internet-france [hereinafter AFP, Top Legal Body]; Marguerite Reardon,
France Passes Controversial Antipiracy Bill, ZDNET UK, May 13, 2oo9, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/
internet/o,100000o097,39651441,oo.htm; see Crumley, supra note 18; Gunn, supra note 18; Posting of
Bruce Gain, supra note 18.
203. Posting of Bruce Gain, supra note 18.
204. AFP, Top Legal Body, supra note 202; David Meyer, EC: New Net-Neutrality Law is Unnecessary,




Constitutionnel recently approved a new French law, substantially similar
to the old one which it declared unconstitutional, which will suspend
subscribers' internet accounts for a year and fine subscribers if they
ignore two warnings.2 5 In New Zealand, a recently-passed law requires
ISPs to terminate "repeat offenders"-people who have been alleged to
infringe copyright three times.' ISPs were already implementing the
New Zealand law to terminate alleged repeat infringers," but outrage
amongst internet users has led the New Zealand government to back off
its tough stance and propose a new administrative solution, where a
government agency would punish offenders and potentially terminate
their internet connections." While this plan is still developing, it appears
that the internet subscriber could receive at least two notices before
having an opportunity to contest the allegations and would have to
proceed to mediation to challenge the allegations." Finally, in the
United Kingdom, ISPs have voluntarily agreed to send warning letters to
file sharers and terminate repeat offenders.2 0 The British Government
recently considered legislation that would require ISP monitoring and
warning.' While the British legislation did not pass, ISPs are working
with representatives of copyright holders,"' and an Irish ISP recently
agreed to a "three strikes and you're out" plan.2 3 Under this plan,
"[f]irst-time offenders will get a warning on their bill; a second offense
will see service 'throttled,' which means that download speeds will be
reduced to a snail's pace, and a third offense will cause disconnection.""4
Like the ISP-RIAA collaborations in the United States, these
programs-with the exception of the New Zealand program-all suspend
205. See Eric Pfanner, France Approves Wide Crackdown on Net Piracy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.cOm/2009/Io/23/technology/23net.html. The law requires that a judge
consider the allegations before allowing suspension of the account. Id.
2o6. Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008, 2oo8 Pub. Act. No. 27 (N.Z.), available
at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2oo8/0o27/latest/DLMi 122643.html. Note that while the
language of section 92A of the New Zealand Copyright Act is similar to the language of the DMCA's
repeat infringer policy, discussed supra Part III, ISPs in New Zealand are already implementing
section 92A to terminate the accounts of alleged infringers upon receiving notices of alleged
infringement. See Drinnan, supra note 18.
207. Drinnan, supra note 18.
2o8. New Zealand Govt Reveals New "Three-Strikes" Plan, July 14, 2009, http://
www.zeropaid.com/news/86639/new-zealand-govt-reveals-new-three-strikes-plan/.
209. Id.
2zo. Georgie Rogers, Piracy Crackdown Works, BBC, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
6music/news/2oo8iol3_downloaders.shtml.
211. Rogers, supra note 18; Ward, supra note 18.
212. David Meyer, Virgin-Universal Deal May Hit 'Persistent' File Sharers, CNET NEWS, June 15,
2oo9, http://news.cnet.com/83o1-o23-3-1o264472-93.html?tag=mncol (discussing new deal that would
lead to temporary suspensions of Internet access based on "information coming from the record
company"); Rogers, supra note 210.
213. Hearne, supra note 18.
21 4. Id
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or terminate internet users' connections because of alleged infringement,
without proof of actual infringement. Although the New Zealand
program would allow the subscriber to contest the alleged infringement
in front of the Copyright Tribunal,"' it also raises some difficult
questions. First, one can easily imagine subscribers being kept from
lawful content and applications of their choice under such a system,
although the government involvement and independent determination of
infringement are improvements over a purely ISP-RIAA collaboration 6
Further, as it requires mediation in the event of a dispute, does this mean
that the subscriber-who may still have been targeted based on an
erroneous allegation-must now pay the costs of mediation to clear her
name? Finally, the New Zealand law requires only "reasonable grounds"
to suspect infringement.' 7 Like DMCA takedown notices, a "reasonable
grounds" standard may lead to errors, and the machinery of the state will
be invoked against innocent people who will likely pay to avoid the
trouble. 18 Thus, like the proposed ISP-RIAA collaborations in the
United States, all of these collaborations run the risk of depriving
internet subscribers of lawful content and applications based on mere
allegations.
As discussed above, the state of this area of law is in flux around the
world. However, invalidating any agreements that allow for termination
of an internet connection on less than a showing of actual infringement
strikes the right balance between protecting the legitimate interests of
the subscriber, the ISP, and the copyright holder."' As problematic ISP-
RIAA collaborations, sometimes with government involvement, become
more prevalent worldwide in their various permutations, the world may
look to the United States for guidance in balancing the user's right to
access lawful content with the copyright holder's and the ISP's legitimate
(and increasingly coinciding) interests.
V. No COUNTERARGUMENTS TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO
ACCESS CONTENT OF ITS CHOICE; THEREFORE, NONE OF THEM
HARMONIZE THE ISP-RIAA COLLABORATIONS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE INTERNET POLICY STATEMENT
This Note's argument, that the ISP-RIAA collaborations fail under
the Internet Policy Statement and that the FCC should adopt and apply
215. See New Zealand Govt Reveals New "Three-Strikes" Plan, supra note 208.
216. This new legal development in New Zealand bears at least a superficial similarity to that
proposed by Professors Lemley and Reese, in which an administrative agency would determine who
was a repeat infringer under the DMCA. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 1421.
217. Id.
218. Of course, "reasonable grounds" is probably an improvement over a "good faith belief," the
current standard for a takedown notice, discussed supra Part II.A.2.
219. See supra Part III.
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Professor Nimmer's interpretation of the repeat infringer standard to
invalidate the ISP-RIAA collaborations, is susceptible to certain likely
counterarguments. They shall be briefly reviewed and dispelled in order
of decreasing importance. Ultimately, none of the counterarguments
offer a convincing reason to uphold the ISP-RIAA collaborations.
A. FIRST OBJECTION: AN ISP's CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS OR THE DMCA
COULD ALLOW FOR TERMINATION OF A SUBSCRIBER'S INTERNET UPON A
LESSER SHOWING
One argument against this Note's interpretation of the Internet
Policy Statement, and how it should be applied to ISP-RIAA
collaborations, is that ISPs have the power to terminate their subscribers
upon a lesser showing than adjudication, or actual knowledge, of
infringement. For instance, Comcast's Subscriber's Agreement and
Acceptable Use Policies provide broad conditions under which it can
terminate its customers' high-speed internet, although it seems to require
unlawful activity- something greater than allegations.220 As Professor
Nimmer explains, a subscriber who is often accused of infringement
generates extra costs for the ISP, and the repeat infringer policy only
prescribes when an ISP must terminate an infringer."' At some level of
cost, it may be inefficient for the ISP to keep the alleged infringer as a
customer and the ISP will want to terminate service to the customer,2 2 2
who may also be contributing to congestion on the network.2 23
This argument has some intuitive appeal because one may think that
the ISP should not be forced to keep a subscriber it does not want,
especially if its subscriber has become expensive. Like any shop or
restaurant, the ISP may argue that it reserves the right to refuse service
to anyone. However, this argument speaks precisely to the problem with
the proposed ISP-RIAA collaborations. Saying that the ISP's rising cost
in responding to the DMCA takedown notices-meritless or not-
justifies terminating the subscriber only provides further incentive for
copyright holders to send multiple meritless, erroneous DMCA
takedown notices. In certain cases-such as when one's access to lawful
content and applications over the internet is at stake - ISPs should not be
220. Comcast.net Subscriber Agreement (2009), http://www.comcast.net/terms/subscriber/. The
agreement may be terminated for, among other reasons, violation of the Acceptable Use Policy. Id.;
see Comcast Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 81. The Acceptable Use Policy allows Comcast to
terminate users who use too much bandwidth and allows Comcast to block transmissions that violate
other portions of the Acceptable Use Policy-such as the DMCA provisions. Id. While the Acceptable
Use Policy mentions Comcast's compliance with the DMCA and Comcast's obligations to remove
allegedly infringing material, Comcast does not claim the right to terminate alleged infringers,
although under section I of the Policy, copyright infringement would be a violation of the Policy. Id.
221. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § Io(B)(3)(b).
222. Id.
223. See McDowell, supra note it.
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able to exercise this potential contractual right at the behest of copyright
holders. That subscriber, who was potentially accessing lawful content
and erroneously or abusively targeted by the RIAA, was not considered
a burden to the ISP before the takedown notices arrived.224
The FCC should invalidate ISP-RIAA collaborations and prevent
potential terminations and suspensions based on allegations. Further,
ISPs' contractual arrangements with subscribers, which prohibit unlawful
activity,' should be construed narrowly to avoid terminations based on
allegations of copyright infringement. Terminations based on allegations,
no matter how numerous the allegations, violate the principles of the
Internet Policy Statement. Thus, even if the ISP has the right to
terminate service, the ISP-RIAA collaborations should not be upheld on
that basis.
Similarly, any argument that the DMCA's repeat infringer policy
could possibly require termination on a lesser showing-that of alleged0 226Asdsu
infringement-is unconvincing. As discussed previously, Congress
specifically used the words "alleged" and "claimed" in the DMCA when
it meant those things2 7 and did not do so in the repeat infringer policy.
While there is a dearth of case law on point, Professor Nimmer's
authoritative interpretation should stand.
B. SECOND OBJECTION: THE INTERNET POLICY STATEMENT DOES NOT
HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW, AND THE FCC DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE IT
Another potential counterargument is that the FCC's Internet
Policy Statement is just that-a statement of policy-without the force of
law. Indeed, Comcast has appealed the FCC's Order2 2 9 and challenges the
224. As previously discussed, even the FCC acknowledged that ISPs may incorporate reasonable
network management programs that do not discriminate against content or applications. See supra
Part III.B. Thus, any potential congestion-related concerns are still valid. However, because of the
importance of allowing users access to the lawful content of their choice, see supra Part I.B.,
congestion-related concerns should not be used as a pretext for discrimination against peer-to-peer
users without proof of actual infringement.
225. See supra note 220.
226. Lemley & Reese, supra note 134, at 142o n.292 (discussing the copyright owner's broad
reading of "repeat infringer"').
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
228. See supra Part Ill.B.
229. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. o8-1291, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7028 (D.C. Cir. Apr. i, 2009)
(dismissing related actions seeking Comcast's immediate end to network management practices as
moot); Steven Musil, Comcast Appeals FCC Traffic-Blocking Ruling, CNET NEWS, Sept. 4, 2oo8,
http://news.cnet.com/83ol-13578_3-0033376-38.html (discussing Comcast's appeal); Todd Shields,
Comcast Seeks Reversal of FCC on Internet Management, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=2o6ono103&sid=a6fdbkXHcRxM, Sept. 4, 2oo8. For a discussion of the argument that
policy statements do not have the force of law, see Telecommunications Research & Action Center v.
FCC, Soo F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This case notes that a policy statement is "neither a rule
nor a precedent . ... [L]ike a press release, [it] presages an upcoming rulemaking or announces the
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FCC's jurisdiction to even regulate broadband, let alone apply the
Internet Policy Statement.230
However, this argument fails on multiple counts. First, the FCC
painstakingly asserted the grounds for its jurisdiction in its Comcast
Order.3' It chose to proceed with an enforceable Internet Policy
Statement.2 3' Before the 2008 Comcast Order, the FCC notified ISPs that
it intended to enforce the Statement in its ongoing policymaking
activities.2 33 Further, Comcast actually stated in Court, in a prior legal
action regarding its network management practices, that "claims that
Comcast's network management practices are 'unfair' or that they are
'unlawful' because they violate.., the FCC's Internet Policy
Statement ... are squarely in the heartland of the FCC's primary
jurisdiction."234 While this is the subject of Comcast's current appeal, it is
no reason not to currently apply the Internet Policy Statement in this
novel context. Moreover, as the FCC's proposed draft rules incorporate
all of the principles of the Internet Policy Statement,235 1it appears that the
FCC's network neutrality principles are here to stay.
C. THIRD OBJECTION: THE ISP-RIAA COLLABORATIONs ARE NOT
"NETWORK MANAGEMENT"
One may also argue that the principles of the Internet Policy
Statement have only been applied to network-wide throttling and have
never been applied to programs like the ISP-RIAA collaborations that
identify alleged infringers and suspend or terminate their internet
connections. The argument might go on to say that since these
course which the agency intends to follow in future adjudications." Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). However, policy statements also leave room for an
agency to exercise discretion. See Am. Bus Ass'n v. ICC, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 198o) (policy
statement "acts [only] prospectively" and "genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to
exercise discretion").
230. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 14.
231. Id. 1 12-27.
232. Id. 13.
233. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 36.
234. Comcast Order, supra note 12, 23 n.io9 (alterations in original) (quoting Defendants' Reply
Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3, Hart v. Comcast of Alameda, No. C-
07-o6350-PJH (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2oo8)). Additionally, the FCC's interpretations of the
Communications Act may be entitled to some deference in court because
whether or not they enjoy any express delegation of authority on a particular question,
agencies charged with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices,
and while not all of those choices bind judges to follow them, they certainly may influence
courts facing questions the agencies have already answered. "[T]he well-reasoned views of
the agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."'
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,642 (1998)).
235. See Press Release, FCC, supra note 21.
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collaborations are more targeted than Comcast's throttling and are not
implemented on a network-wide level, the Internet Policy Statement is
not implicated.
This argument fails because, as previously discussed, the ISP-RIAA
collaborations should qualify as network management. At its base level,
an ISP-RIAA collaboration polices the network's content and
membership and improves other subscribers' connectivity., 6 Further, the
Internet Policy Statement's net neutrality principles should apply to any
measures taken by ISPs with the potential to take away people's access
to lawful content, regardless of their form. This crucial consideration
should not be ignored because the collaboration only targets alleged
infringers or because it does not look like past network management
practices. Failing to apply the Internet Policy Statement's principles to
such a pervasive network-level activity would elevate form over
substance and ignore the purposes of the FCC's Internet Policy
Statement.
CONCLUSION
The ISP-RIAA collaborations should be evaluated under the FCC's
Internet Policy Statement. Although the ISP-RIAA collaborations are
unlike traditional forms of network management, the Internet Policy
Statement should apply in this new context. ISP-RIAA collaborations
that will suspend or terminate internet connections based upon mere
allegations fail under the Internet Policy Statement because they deprive
subscribers of lawful content. Furthermore, the FCC should adopt
Professor Nimmer's interpretation of the DMCA's repeat infringement
policy and apply it in a novel way to invalidate ISP-RIAA collaborations
that terminate internet connections based on mere allegations. Requiring
that one's internet connection cannot be terminated unless one has
repeatedly been held liable for infringement balances the public's right to
access lawful content with the RIAA and the ISPs' interest in,
respectively, stopping copyright infringement and easing network
congestion.
It is impossible to tell where the future of combined ISP-RIAA
efforts to deter copyright infringement will lead in the United States. But
two things are certain. First, ISPs worldwide are increasingly motivated
to work with copyright holders to stop copyright infringement. Second,
United States ISPs do not have a blank check to stop copyright
infringement. In attempting to stop copyright infringement, ISPs must
respect the principle of network neutrality and the robust, innovative
internet that it helped to create.
236. The RIAA's general counsel himself derided "dumb pipes" (network neutrality) and said that
more efficient traffic monitoring was necessary. See Triplett, supra note 66.
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